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I. INTRODUCTION
At the time, the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Smith'
showed early promise of a path-breaking approach to section 12 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.2 True enough, in striking the
Narcotic ControlAct'si minimum sentence, the Supreme Court of Canada
cautioned against stigmatizing every disproportionate or excessive
sentence.4 Mister Justice Lamer's reasons stressed, instead, that the test for
review should be relatively strict, and should require a finding of gross
disproportionality between the offence committed and the sentence
imposed.5 Still, he found a violation of section 12's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment, because section 5(1) of the Narcotic ControlAct
required a seven-year prison sentence for importing narcotics, without
regard to the type or quantity of the substance involved. Under section 1 of
the Charter, Mr. Justice Lamer held that the mandatory sentence had to fail
the Qakes test's6 requirement of minimal impairment. Given the availability
of other means to achieve the legislative goal, there was no need for an
indiscriminate sentence, and little reason to jail small-time offenders to
deter serious drug traffickers 7
Almost fifteen years later, Smith stands as the sole instance of the
Supreme Court of Canada's willingness to strike a mandatory sentence
under section 12 of the Charter.8 Nor does it appear that the pattern is
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 [hereinafter Smith].
2 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11 [hereinafter Charter]. Section 12 of the Charter provides
that "[ejveryone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment."
3 Narcotic ControlAct, R.S.C., 1985, c. N-I [repealed 1996, c.19, s.94].
4 Smith,supra note I at 1072 (per Mr. Justice Lamer). While Madame Justice Wilson, Mr. Justice
LeDain and Mr. Justice La Forest agreed that the minimum sentence was unconstitutional (Mr. Justice
McIntyre dissenting), Chief Justice Dickson was the only member of the panel to join Mr. Justice
Lamer's reasons.
5 Ibid. (stating that s. 12 will only be infringed where the sentence is so unfit, having regard to the
offence and the offender, as to be grossly disproportionate).
6 R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 [hereinafter Oakes].
7Supra note I at 1080-81 (stating that a minimum sentence, if necessary, could be based on the
quantity of drug imported, the type of narcotic imported, the offender's status, or a combination of
factors).
8 See R. v. Luxton, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 711 (upholding the Criminal Code's mandatory sentence of
twenty-five years, without parole, for first-degree murder); and R. v. Goltz, [19911 3 S.C.R. 485
(upholding a minimum penalty of seven days' imprisonment for driving while prohibited, under the
428
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about to change: the Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed that only in
exceptional circumstances will minimum prison terms be vulnerable under
the Charter.9 Given its early criminal jurisprudence under the Charter,
which was, for the most part, highly solicitous of the accused's
constitutional rights, the judiciary's caution on this issue might, [on first
impression], seem misplaced. As to sentencing, the conventional wisdom
is that discretion best serves the objectives of the criminal justice system by
responding to the circumstances of particular offences committed by
specific individuals."0 By substituting an inflationary floor for the attention
to any number of factors customarily thought to be the hallmark of justice
at the sentencing phase of a criminal trial, mandatory minima compromise
the wisdom of that age-old truism that the punishment should fit the crime.
From a constitutional perspective, it may be difficult to understand
how any mandatory sentence could survive the proportionality phase of the
Oakes test. By definition, the imposition of a mandatory prison term
contradicts the concept of minimal impairment. In fact, mandatory
sentences resemble complete bans on expressive freedom in the sense that
both contemplate a form of absolute interference with freedom, and in
neither case do the circumstances matter at all. Yet, while complete bans
on section 2(b)'s entitlement are notoriously difficult to justify, mandatory
minima have been consistently upheld since Smith.n One reason is that,
while section 1 of the Charter invariably decides the constitutionality of
restrictions on expressive freedom, sentencing provisions rarely proceed to
that stage of the analysis. Absent a breach of section 12's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment or treatment, section l's test of
British Columbia Motor Tlhic leAct).
See R %. Aorrise,, [20001 2 S.C.R. 90 (upholding a mandatory mimmum of four years
imprisonment for criminal negligence causing death % ,th a firearm); and/. v% La~trner, 12,111 S,CR,
3 (upholding a mandatory minimum of ten years vathout eligibility for parole for :econdldegree
murder).
1 0 See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1995, c. C-46. amended 1995, c. 2. and 1997, c. 23, s 571G and
713.1-3 (outlining a %ariety of general principles to gude the eercise of discreton m !_zntenanqg)
11 Under s. 2(b), see Peterborough (City) v.Ramsdcn. [1993) 2 S.CR. 1034 (inalidating ab:olute
restrictions on access to public property); and CR-MacDhnaldv. canad  (,4G. 1199513 SCR. 199
(invalidating Parliament's absolute prohibition on tobacco adwert:ing). As for s. 12. e te t
accompanying supra notes S and 9.
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justification and requirement of minimal impairment do not come into
play.'2
Any broad commentary on the relationship between the Charter's
guarantees and section l's standard of justification is beyond the scope of
this article. Likewise, it is not possible to engage a full analysis of the
Supreme Court of Canada's conception of cruel and unusual punishment
under section 12. Suffice to say that a restrictive definition of the
entitlement has enabled the Supreme Court of Canada to uphold
mandatory sentences without having to confront the obstacle presented by
section I's proportionality requirement of minimal impairment. Yet by
asking whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate under section 12, the
Supreme Court of Canada imports a section 1 concept of justification into
its definition of the guarantee. The resulting hybrid analysis is characterized
as an interpretation of the right but effectively functions as a form of
section 1 analysis. By design, though, the assessment is incomplete. An
approach that focuses on the question of breach, at the expense of
justification under section 1, allows the Supreme Court of Canada to avoid
those parts of the Oakes test that cannot be satisfied.
If there is cause for dissatisfaction over Canada's approach to
mandatory minima, little is gained by turning to the American experience.
Outside the death penalty, virtually no constitutional recourse exists in the
United States for offenders convicted of crimes that attract mandatory
sentences. For purposes of comparison and critique, this paper provides an
overview of mandatory minima under the United States Constitution, 3 with
the following caveat. Sentencing in the United States is a subject of
unimaginable complexity. Consequently, it is not feasible in this space to
attempt more than a general outline. Accordingly, the article is divided into
three parts: the first identifies three factors that provide a context for
understanding the relationship between the Eighth Amendment and
sentencing policy in the United States; the second analyzes the
developments that led up to the United States Supreme Court's key
12 But see Golz, supra note 8 at 522-33 (per Madame Justice McLachlin, as she then was,
declaring in dissent that the violation "could not be said to infringe the rights protected by s. 12 'as
little as possible' nor would the effects in all circumstances be proportional to the objectives to be
served," and that the driving offence could not be saved under s. I of the Charter because it is
overbroad. As she stated, "the material does not demonstrate any obvious or probable need for a
deterrent which has such an indiscriminate reach").
13 U.S. Const. amend. VIII [hereinafter Constitution).
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decision in Harmelin v. Michigan;14 and the third offers observations and
conclusions about the relationship between constitutional interpretation
and sentencing in Canada and the United States.
II. MANDATORY PRISON SENTENCES, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT, AND FEDERALISM
Even on a superficial examination, there is little similarity between
mandatory sentences in Canada and the United States. Although not
unknown, minimum prison terms are not common in this country. The
Criminal Code provisions guaranteeing that those convicted of first- and
second-degree murderwill serve sentences of determinate lengthsmayhave
helped assuage the public when Canada abolished the death penalty. 5
Leaving that example aside, there are no more than twenty-nine offences
in the Criminal Code that carry a mandatory minimum sentence at
present. 6 Yet a trend is developing with the introduction of a number of
mandatory sentences in recent years, especially in relation to firearms
offences."7 As far as legislators are concerned, it seems that the mandatory
minimum has attained a measure of respectability. The question for the
moment, then, is whether the Supreme Court of Canada's reluctance to
discourage these initiatives will embolden Parliament to increasingly rely
on such measures in the future.
Turning to the United States, an initial point of comparison is that,
rather than the exception, mandatory sentences are pervasive, both at
federal and state levels. They are a form of punishment that can be traced
back at least two centuries. However, mandatory minimum sentences did
not gather momentum as a crime control device until the 1950s, when the
federal government signaled its support for harsh penalties by introducing
the Narcotic ControlAct of 1956. Some years later, in further response to
14 50 1 U.S. 957 (1991) (upholding a mandatory life sentence without parole under the state of
Michigan's 650-life drug law) [hereinafter Harnzeh].
15Crnimnal Code, supra note 10 at s. 745 (establishing mandatory life sentences for thoze
convicted of murder, and detailing, in its subparagraphs, the schemes that apply to first- and second-
degree murder).
16 N. Crutcher, "The Legislative History of Mandator, Minimum Penalties of Imprionment in
Canada" (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall LJ. 273.
17 For a partial list of these offences see Monisev., supra note 9 at 129-30 (pcr Madame Jmtica
Arbour, dissenting in part).
is Pub. L No. 84-728, 70 Stat. 651 (1956).
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the problems associated with drug trafficking and drug abuse, another
initiative emerged with the Comprehensive DrugAbuse and Prevention and
Control Act19 of 1970. When it subsequently became clear that such
measures were neither fair nor efficacious, federal legislation eliminated
most minima related to drug offences, with the exception of the Continuing
Criminal Enterprise 20 offences. By the 1980s, however, mandatory
sentences began to rebound, starting with federal statutes that placed a
focus on drug offences, violent crime, and serious felonies.2' In 1994,
President William Jefferson Clinton signed the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act,22 which provides for the long-term removal from
society of persons convicted of a third violent felony. Congress enacted its
mandatory life-imprisonment scheme, or "three-strikes" law, against a
backdrop of anti-crime sentiment that prompted more than sixteen state
legislatures to consider similar measures.23
Although recidivist statutes have an enviable pedigree in the history
of American criminal justice, the three-strikes sports metaphor is a more
recent phenomenon that has, for the time being, captured the United
States' imagination. Between 1993 and 1995, twenty-four states enacted
such legislation, which generally requires long prison terms for criminals
with three convictions for specified offences.24 Three-strikes is a generic
term that can accommodate any number of statutory variations. For
example, a typical model might impose a life sentence without release for
twenty-five years, following a third conviction for a serious violent crime.2"
Even so, the range can be significant within the generic. For instance, the
state of Washington requires a minimum ten year sentence on conviction
for a second felony, third misdemeanour, or third petit larceny, and life
19 Pub. L No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236, codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-1509 (1970).
20 K. Lutjen, "Culpability and Sentencing under Mandatory Minimums and the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: The Punishment no Longer Fits the Criminal" (1996) 10 N.D. J. L, Ethics &
Pub. Pol'y 389 at 396.
21 Ibid. at 395-99.
22 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902-1955, codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (1994).
23 R.D. O'Connor, "Defining the Strike Zone-An Analysis of the Classification of Prior
Convictions Under the Federal 'Three-Strikes and You're Out' Scheme" (1995) 36 B.C.L. Rev. 847
at 848-49. This article provides an extensive review and analysis of mandatory minima in the federal
justice system.
24 T. Marvell & C. Moody, "The Lethal Effects of Three-Strikes Laws" (2001) 30 J. of Leg. Stud.
89.
25 Ibid.
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imprisonment in the case of a third felony, fifth misdemeanour, or fifth
petit larceny. Meanwhile, California's three-strikes law subjects a person
convicted of a second felony to punishment that doubles the sentence given
a first time felony offender; under the same legislation, an offender
convicted of a third violent or serious felony must serve the greater of
twenty-five years imprisonment or triple the sentence of a first time felony
offender.26
Two further examples illustrate how three-strikes laws raise
questions of proportionality between the offence committed and sentence
imposed. In California, a man with prior felony comictions was sentenced
to twenty-five years to life for the clinching offence: he stole one slice of
pizza.27 Elsewhere, an accused was sentenced to life imprisonment, albeit
following earlier convictions, for stealing one hundred dollars from a
bicycist.' If the punishment sounds harsh, the rationale of three-strikes
legislation is that offence-specific incarceration does little to rehabilitate a
core group of criminals. "Selective incapacitation" is viewed as the solution
to that problem. It removes individuals from circulation, often for life, to
prevent them from having the opportunity to commit any further offences.P
Three-strikes laws are controversial for any number of reasons.
Even a brief canvas of the literature little confidence in the deterrence
value of such measures. As well, mandatory sentences contribute to
overcrowding in American prisons. " In addition, mandatory sentences
enhance prosecutorial discretion at the expense of the authority
26 This information is taken from M. McClain, "Three Strikes and You're Out The Solution to
the Repeat Offender Problem?" (1996) 20 Seton Hall Legisl. J. 97.
27Ibid. at 117, n. 90 (detailing the defendant's prior convitions for robbery, attempted robbery,
drug possession and unauthorized use of a vehicle, but noting that under the fentence impzad for
stealing a piece of pizza the accused would face the same jail time as if he had raped a taoman,
molested a child or committed a car-jacking).
28 Ibid at n. 92 (explaining that the defendant had been convicted of possession of drugs.
disturbing the peace, resisting arrest and two countsoftheft. neitherofwhichwas clas-ified asaviolent
crime; adding, as well, that the three-strikes law came into effect one day before he stole Ste) from
a bicyclist, and that rendered him a three-time felon vho faced a prison sentence of twenty.fiva cars
to life, a sentence "roughly three times what a convicted murderer would erve").
29 The notion is that if a small group of incorrigible career criminals is respaonible for a majority
of serious crimes, then long prison terms will remoic them from circulation and thereby reduce the
crime rate. Supporters of three-strikes laws maintain that such statutes v. Wll end the criminal careers
of high-rate offenders. See L Beres & T. Griffith, -Do Three Strikes Laws Make Sense? Habitual
Offender Statutes and Criminal Incapacitation" (1993) 37 Geo LJ. 103 at 113-14.
30 Supra note 20 at 417-19.
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traditionally exercised by trial courts. Most importantly, as the above
examples show, three-strikes laws invite and validate disproportionalities
between the offence committed and the sentence imposed. 2
Another form the mandatory minimum sentence takes in the
United States is absolute punishment for the first-time commission of
certain offences. One example, the so-called "650-life" provision, destines
an individual convicted of a drug offence to life imprisonment, often
without parole. Although possession of a threshold amount of drugs
triggers the sentence under this variation, one factor discussed by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Smith, this kind of mandatory sentence is
imposed without individualized sentencing.33
A second variable in the United States is capital punishment, which
was abolished in Canada some years ago. 4 Though the death sentence is
not a minimum today, as it once was in many states, debate as to its
constitutionality remains current. Though now constrained by the
"individualized capital sentencing doctrine," capital punishment is unique
because it is final. Despite the evolution of limits on the death penalty in
the jurisprudence, the availability of ultimate punishment affects the
constitutional status of non-capital sentencing. If the death sentence-the
state's most extreme penalty for the commission of crime-is not
unconstitutional, it is difficult to imagine how any lesser punishment,
including one that imposes life imprisonment without parole, can offend
the Eighth Amendment.35
31 Ibid. at 419-24.
3 2 "The unbending rigidity of mandatory minimums has led to a host of problems unanticipated
or inadequately considered by their drafters, and have augmented the disparity, manipulability, and
uncertainty already present in the federal sentencing system. Mandatory minimums shift the focus of
sentencing away from the offender and his or her culpability to the offense and its perceived
seriousness. To underemphasize the characteristics, history, and role of an offender is to sacrifice
proportionality for the procedural benefits of uniformity and certainty." Ibid. at 390. The same critique
applies to mandatory sentences in state criminal justice systems.
3 3 Typically, as in Harmelin,supra note 14, this law imposes a mandatory sentence of life in prison
without possibility of parole, on conviction of possessing 650 grams or more of cocaine, and without
consideration of mitigating factors.
34 Canada abolished the death penalty in 1976. As for extradition, the Supreme Court of Canada
has now decided that individuals cannot be extradited unless assurances are given that the death
penalty will neither be sought nor imposed: United States v. Burns, 120011 1 S.C.R. 283 (hereinafter
Burns].
35 Supra note 13. The Eighth Amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
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A third and final consideration affects the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. In Canada, given the
Constitution Act's 6 allocation of criminal law to the federal government,
division of powers issues do not play a significant role in the debate about
sentencing, including mandatory minima." In the United States, though,
where the fifty states have jurisdiction over criminal justice, the situation is
entirely different. Each state has the power to define the substantive
criminal law and to adopt whatever sentencing policies it chooses. The
federal government adds a further layer of complexity by exercising
criminal law powers despite the lack of express constitutional authority to
do so."
For purposes of this article, federalism has the following
implications for the Eighth Amendment. As far as the United States
Supreme Court is concerned, state jurisdiction over criminal justice poses
a serious obstacle to the constitutional review of sentencing laws.
Accordingly, outside of capital offences, the United States Supreme Court
has effectively abandoned the task of establishing sentencing standards to
govern the policies adopted by fifty states with differing conceptions of just
deserts. As for the federal government's sentencing practices, separation of
powers concerns lean the United States Supreme Court in a deferential
direction, albeit for different reasons."
This introduction identified the dynamics that affect the United
States Supreme Court's response to mandatory minima. The prevalence of
mandatory sentences is not the only point of difference that sets the United
States apart from Canada. In addition, members of the United States
Supreme Court cannot agree whether the Eighth Amendment applies in
non-capital cases. Though some justices reject the possibility that non-
capital sentences can be considered a form of cruel and unusual
punishment, others take the view that penalties are subject to
proportionality review regardless whether the sentence imposed is death or
life imprisonment. Moreover, some maintain that objective criteria of
3 6 See infra note 37.
37 See ConstitutionAct, 1567(U.K.),30&31 Vict.,c3.s.91(27) (grantingthe federalgwiriment
exclusive jurisdiction over "The Criminal Law, except the Constitution of Courts of Criminal
Jurisdiction, but including the Procedure in Criminal Matters7).
3S See the Sentencing Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 t198S), v.hich created the Sentencing
Commission. Further discussion and analysis of federal sentencng is beyond the ceolr of tht paper.
United States v. Mistretta, 4S8 U.S. 361 (1939) (concluding that federal_'entencing gutdelines
were a valid and constitutional delegation of legislatie authority to the Sentencing Covmmr ion, and
that the separation of po-,.ers between legislative and.judicial branches had not been violated).
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proportionality can be formulated and applied to the full range of
sentencing policies across the nation. Yet, the naysayers contend that
objectivity in sentencing is impossible and therefore reject the suggestion
that the Eighth Amendment places limits on state sentencing policies.
III. NO PENALTY IS PER SE CONSTITUTIONAL 0
The status of mandatory prison sentences under the Eighth
Amendment reached a turning point in Harmelin.4 t There, by a fragmented
and contentious vote, a majority in the United States Supreme Court
upheld the state of Michigan's 650-life law. Earlier decisions, including the
United States Supreme Court's landmark opinions on the death penalty,
serve as a prelude to the intense disagreements in Harmelin. In essence,
whether the issue is one of capital punishment or a prison term, and
whether the question arises under recidivist legislation or not, the United
States Supreme Court has been fundamentally unable to come to terms
with mandatory sentences.
Constitutional wrangling about the Eighth Amendment broke open
in the early 1970s with Furman v. Georgia,4 2 which was followed, in
relatively short order, by Gregg v. Georgia,43 Woodson v. North Carolina,44
and Coker v. Georgia.45 In the aftermath of Furman's shocking suggestion
that capital punishment was unconstitutional, the United States Supreme
Court found it necessary to regroup. Gregg accordingly clarified that the
death penalty is not invariably cruel and unusual punishment, that it is not
an inherently barbaric or unacceptable mode of punishment, and that it is
not always disproportionate to the crime forwhich it has been imposed. Put
another way, whether a capital sentence offends the Eighth Amendment
raises a situational, or contextual question. According to Gregg, a
40 Solem v. Helm, infra note 49.
41 Supra note 14.
42 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (concluding that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty
would constitute cruel and unusual punishment) [hereinafter Furman].
43 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (concluding that Georgia's statutory scheme for the imposition of the
death penalty satisfied the concerns of Furman and was constitutional) [hereinafter Gregg].
44 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (concluding that North Carolina's mandatory death sentence for first-
degree murder violated the Constitution).
45 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (invalidating the state of Georgia's death sentence for the crime of rape,
as grossly disproportionate and an excessive punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment)
[hereinafter Coker].
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punishment will be excessive and unconstitutional if it makes no
measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and is nothing
more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering.
Alternatively, a punishment Will violate the Eighth Amendment if it is
grossly out ofproportion to the severi, of the crime. In the years since Gregg,
the United States Supreme Court's case law has see-sawed on the crucial
question of whether the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment in
certain circumstances. For example, Coker, which was decided alongside
Gregg, held that imposing the death penalty for the crime of rape was a
grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment, that violated the
Constitution.4 7
A few years after Furman opened up the Eighth Amendment,
Rummel v. Estelle4S and Solem v. Hehn49 raised the question whether the
same principle of proportionality could apply to non-capital cases. The fact
that death is the most extreme sanction does not mean it is the only form
of punishment that is cruel and unusual. Unfortunately, in considering that
proposition, the United States Supreme Court has been unable to agree
whether sentencing is subject to the Eighth Amendments proportionality
principle.
In Rummel, a majority led by Mr. Justice Rehnquist dismissed the
prospect of constitutional review, and upheld the sentence. The defendant
in that instance received a life sentence for defrauding a credit card to
obtain $80 worth of goods or services in 1964, forging a check in the
amount of $28.36 in 1969, and obtaining $120.75 by false pretences in
1973.53 A majority of the United States Supreme Court showed few qualms
in condemning him to life in jail for what amounted to a non-violent and
relatively trivial series of offences committed over a period of almost ten
years.51
Mister Justice Rehnquist's opinion flatly rejected the suggestion
that a proportionality principle had somehow been incorporated into non-
4 6 Supra note 43 at 187 (emphasis added).
4 7 Supra note 45 at 592.
4S445 U.S. 263 (1980) (Mr. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell and Stevens, diz=ntng)
[hereinafter Runmad].
49 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justices White, Rehnqust and Madatic
Justice O'Connor, dissenting) [hereinafter Solem].
50 Supra note 4S at 265-67.
51 Mr. Justice Rehnquist noted that under the Texas 1oalicyofgrant ing"geod time" creditz-, there
was a possibility of parole for Rummel, "however slim" 7it might be. Ib:, at 2,0-S.
2001]
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capital cases by the death penalty jurisprudence. Thus, he stated, "[o]utside
the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the
proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.""2 Citing
Mr. Justice Stewart in Furman, he explained the fundamental difference of
the death penalty: capital punishment is "unique in its total irrevocability",
"unique in its rejection of the rehabilitation of the convict," and "unique,
finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of
humanity." 53 After dismissing Weems v. United States as an isolated and
exceptional precedent, the United States Supreme Court maintained that
felonies punished by significant terms of imprisonment, including life, are
"purely a matter of legislative prerogative."'54 To recognize that the State
of Texas could have imprisoned William James Rummel for life had he
stolen 5 thousand dollars, 50 thousand dollars, or 500 thousand dollars,
rather than the $120.75 he took in committing his third offence, Mr. Justice
Rehnquist declared, "is virtually to concede that the lines to be drawn are
indeed 'subjective' and therefore properly within the province of
legislatures, not courts."
55
He also emphasized the impossibility of formulating objective
criteria to measure the proportionality of sentencing legislation in fifty
states. What is the United States Supreme Court to do, he inquired, when
Arizona regards it a felony to steal any "neat or homed animal"; when
stealing "avocadoes, olives, citrus or deciduous fruits, nuts and artichokes"
is serious in California; and when stealing one hundred dollars in one state
will earn the thief a short jail term in one state and ten years' imprisonment
in another.56 Emphasizing the obvious, that "[pjenologists themselves have
been unable to agree whether sentences should be light or heavy," Mr.
Justice Rehnquist concluded that "any 'nationwide trend' toward lighter,
discretionary sentences must find its source and its sustaining force in the
legislatures, not in the federal courts."57 Leaving such institutional and
federalism concerns aside, he agreed that the state had an interest in
treating those more harshly who "by repeated criminal acts have shown that
52 Ibid. at 272.
53 Ibid.
5 4 Ibid. at 274. See also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (concluding that cadena
temporal, which consisted of fifteen years' imprisonment in hard labour with chains, for falsifying a
public record, violated the Eighth Amendment).
55 Ibid. at 275-76.
5 6 Ibid. at 282.
57 Ibid. at 283-84.
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they are incapable of conforming to the norms of society."5 Segregating
such individuals from the rest of society for an extended period of time, in
his view, would not offend the Constitution.
Mr. Justice Powell wrote an angry dissent in Runel's five to four
decision, which complained that the state deprived the accused of freedom
for the rest of his life, simply for defrauding others, cumulatively, of about
$230. Not only was the punishment grossly disproportionate to the crime,
the Texas system assumed that all three-time offenders deserved the same
punishment, as he put it, "whether they commit three murders or cash three
fraudulent checks."5 9 As for the objectivity of criteria, he concluded that "a
mandatory life sentence for defrauding persons of about $230 crosses any
rationally drawn line" between permissible punishment and the standard
set by the Eighth Amendment."
Remarkably, given the views so strongly voiced in Rummel, Mr.
Justice Powell managed to turn the tables in Solem. There, he won majority
support for an opinion that applied the proportionality principle to
invalidate a mandatory life sentence that carried no possibility of parole.61
The defendant's list of convictions was more extensive than those of
Rummel.62 This time, however, a majority of the United States Supreme
Court concluded that the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Far from being reserved
to capital cases, Mr. Justice Powell maintained that the principle of
proportionality is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in the common
law jurisprudence. 63 Though he had little choice but to accept that
"[o]utside the context of capital punishment, successfil challenges to the
proportionality of particular sentences [will be] exceedingly rare," he
5 S IN& at 276.
5 9 
bW- at 302.
60 Ib at 307.
61 Sole, supra note 49. In the intervening case of Hutto v. Daiis, 454 U. &. 370 (1932), the
United States Supreme Court reprimanded an appellate court for not folloring Rumnd and catting
aside a fortyyear sentence and fine for marijuana offences, as a form ofcruel and unusual pumshmcnt.
Mr. Justice Powell concurred in that result, albeit feluctantly, because he regarded Rtrmcl as
controlling.
62 Solenz, ibi- at 279-80. The defendant had been convicted of several non-%iolent felonies.
uttering a no account cheque for one hundred dollars; third.degree burglary (three times); obtaining
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insisted that proportionality analysis is not "entirely inapplicable" in non-
capital cases."
Having concluded that mandatory prison sentences are reviewable,
Mr. Justice Powell identified "objective criteria" to guide the exercise.
Specifically, he proposed that the United States Supreme Court's
proportionality analysis should consider the gravity of the offense and the
harshness of the penalty; the sentences imposed on other criminals in the
same jurisdiction; and the sentences imposed for commission of the same
crime in otherjurisdictions.6' While acknowledging that courts should defer
to the legislatures as well as to the discretion exercised by trial courts, he
stated, in plain and forceful terms, that "no penalty is per se
constitutional." '66
Solem left the justices who had formed the majority in Rummel
fuming in a dissenting opinion. The opinion charged, among other things,
that the United States Supreme Court had "blithely discard [ed] any concept
of stare decisis, trespasse[d] gravely on the authority of the States, and
distort[ed] the concept of proportionality of punishment by tearing it from
its moorings in capital cases."67
The majority claim that it is possible to decree that "one offense has
less gravity than another" was a further issue for the dissenters. Chief
Justice Burger regarded this assertion as "nothing other than a bald
substitution of individual subjective moral values for those of the
legislature." 68 As a result of the majority's opinion, the dissenters declared
that the United States Supreme Court had launched itself into "uncharted
and unchartable waters," where sentences with endless permutations would
have to be tested against criteria "bankrupt of realistic guiding principles."
This approach would "flood the appellate courts with cases in which equally
arbitrary lines must be drawn.,
69
With the United States Supreme Court shifting its position between
Rummel and Solem, it is not difficult to understand why Harmelin70 was so
important. At the time, whether the proportionality principle would
64 Ibid at 289-90 (emphasis in original).
65 Ibid. at 292.
66 Ibid at 290.
67 Ibi. at 304 (per Chief Justice Burger).
68 Ibid. at 314.
6 9 1bid. at 314-15.
70 Supra note 14.
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constrain the imposition of mandatory life sentences remained an open
question. Without excluding the possibility of review in non-capital cases,
Harmelin demonstrated that Mr. Justice Powell's majority in Solem had
gone too far.
The defendant, Harmelin, was sentenced to life imprisonment, with
no possibility of parole, for possession of 672 grams of cocaine. The United
States Supreme Court's decision to uphold his sentence produced no fewer
than five opinions, of which several paragraphs comprising Part IV of Mr.
Justice Scalia's reasons secured majority support. There, he made two vital
points. First, Mr. Justice Scalia stated that severe mandatory penalties may
be cruel, "but they are not unusual in the constitutional sense, having been
employed in various forms throughout our Nation's history."'" In candid
terms, he explained that punishment which is not otherwise cruel and
unusual does not violate the Eighth Amendment simply because it is
mandatory.
72
Second, Mr. Justice Scalia returned to the distinction between
capital and non-capital offences in answer to the suggestion that the
sentence was disproportionate because it did not consider mitigating factors
individual to the defendant's circumstances. Regardless of the gross
disproportionality of a sentence, an individualized determination of the
sentence is only required by the Constitution in capital cases. As he
explained, the individualized capital sentencing doctrine made it clear that
"there is no comparable requirement outside the capital context, because
of the qualitative difference between death and all other penalties.""
Accordingly, he refused to create what he referred to, a touch sarcastically,
as an "individualized mandatory life in prison without parole sentencing
doctrine."7 In so refusing, Mr. Justice Scalia agreed that Harmelin's
sentence was unique in a certain way, because life imprisonment without
parole is the second most severe penalty known to law. Yet, the possibilities
of retroactive legislation reduction and executive clemency ameliorated its
harshness. In conclusion, Mr. Justice Scalia reiterated that even where the
difference between life without parole and any number of other sentences
of imprisonment is greatest, "it cannot be compared with death."7? Because
71 Ibid. at 994-95.
72 Unusual, in this sense, refers to the criteria identified in Gre, guvpra note 43.
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that comparison cannot be made, he said, "[w]e have drawn the line of
required individualized sentencing at capital cases, and see no basis for
extending it further."76
Otherwise, Mr. Justice Scalia's opinion offered a pontification on
the historical origins of the Eighth Amendment, along with a lecture on the
reasonswhy Solem was wrongly decided." Chief Justice Rehnquist was the
only member of the United States Supreme Court to join those parts of the
opinion, which were vigorously rejected by Mr. Justice White, joined by Mr.
Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Stevens in dissent.7' Of greater interest
here are Mr. Justice Kennedy's reasons, in which Madame Justice
O'Connor and Mr. Justice Souter concurred to produce a majority result
upholding Mr. Harmelin's sentence. Despite agreeing with Part IV of Mr.
Justice Scalia's reasons, these judges wrote separately to explain why their
approach to the Eighth Amendment's proportionality analysis differed.
Mister Justice Kennedy took stare decisis as his starting point. He stated
that it "counsels our adherence to the narrow proportionality principle that
has existed in the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for 80 years.
7 9
Without excluding constitutional review in non-capital cases, he argued, the
United States Supreme Court's decisions recognized a "narrow"
proportionality principle which is circumscribed by certain considerations.
Those considerations made it clear that review of mandatory sentences
under the Eighth Amendment is possible, but unlikely just the same.
In the first instance, Justices Kennedy, O'Connor and Souter agreed
that "the fixing of prison terms for specific crimes involves a substantive
penological judgment that ... is 'properly within the province of legislatures,
not courts." ° In this, they accepted that the efficacy of any sentencing
system depends on agreement as to the purposes and objectives of the
penal system. The responsibility for making those choices should rest with
the legislatures. Moreover, as Mr. Justice Kennedy observed, the Eighth
Amendment "does not mandate adoption of any one penological theory,"
and the federal and state justice systems have accorded "different weights
7 6 
Ibid.
77 Ibid. at 965 (stating that "[it should be apparent from the above discussion that our 5-to-4
decision eight years ago in Solem wasscarcely the expression of clearand wellaccepted constitutional law"
(emphasis added).
78 Mr. Justice Marshall also wrote separately in dissent, as did Mr. Justice Stevens, who was
joined by Mr. Justice Blackmun.
79Supra note 14 at 996.
8 0
Ibid. at 998.
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at different times to the penological goals of retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation.""
Thus, Mr. Justice Kennedy concluded that marked divergences both
as to theories of sentencing and the length of prison terms are the
"inevitable, often beneficial" result of the federal structure? In doing so,
he provided a reminder that, "[a]bsent a constitutionally imposed
uniformity inimical to traditional notions of federalism, some State vill
always bear the distinction of treating offenders more severely than any
other State."S3 This consideration raised the question of whether there is
any basis in principle to declare that certain sentences violate the
Constitution. On that point, Solem's third criterion, which contemplated an
exercise in comparative sentencing, had been rejected by Mr. Justice Scalia
on the grounds that it has "no conceivable relevance to the Eighth
Amendment."' In the circumstances, Mr. Justice Kennedy's opinion
provided a more temperate recognition of the implications for federalism
than Mr. Justice Scalia's assertion that the Eighth Amendment is "not a
ratchet."SS
Given these concerns, Mr. Justice Kennedy indicated that objective
factors should inform the proportionality review "to the maximum possible
extent." 6 In making that point, he admitted that "[the courts] decisions
recognize that we lack clear objective standards to distinguish between
sentences for different terms of years."'s? For that reason, Mr. Justice
Kennedy endorsed the distinction between capital and non-capital offences.
To conclude, he declared that the Eighth Amendment does not require
strict proportionality between a crime and its sentence. It only forbids
"extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime." 3 As
for Harmelin, Mr. Justice Kennedy agreed that "it is far from certain that
S1Ibid at 999.
82 1bid
83 Ibi at 1000 (emphasis added).
84 Ibid at 9S9.
85 bi at 990. In full, he stated: "The Eighth Amendment is not a ratchet, vzhercby a tcmparary
consensus on leniency for a particular crime Rxes a permanent constitutional maximum, disabling the
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Michigan's bold experiment [in controlling the drug industry] will succeed."
He nonetheless upheld the 650-life provision.8
9
Even with the opening offered by Justices Kennedy, O'Connor and
Souter, Harmelin made it clear that Mr. Justice Powell's pronouncement
that "no penalty isperse constitutional" was premature. 90 To the contrary,
Harmelin indicated that, outside of circumstances that are exceptional in
the sense of Weems, non-capital penalties are perse constitutional.
IV. SIMILARITY AND DIFFERENCE
The Canadian and American jurisprudence on mandatory minima
is not entirely dissimilar. The Charter directs a bifurcation of analytical
function between sections 12 and 1, which separates the question of cruel
and unusual punishment from the question whether it is justifiable for a
democratic society to inflict punishments of a certain magnitude. As noted
above, this structural construct enables the Supreme Court of Canada to
relax the Charter's requirements in section 12 cases. Rather than subject
mandatory minima to the strict criteria that should apply in every case
under section 1, the Supreme Court of Canada has built a concept of
proportionality into its definition of the entitlement guarantee. This
separation of analytical function will not be found in the American
jurisprudence, where there is no textual counterpart to the Charter's
concept of reasonable limits.
Still, it seems to make little difference, as neither the Supreme
Court of Canada nor the United States Supreme Court has granted the
concept of cruel and unusual punishment a generous interpretation. This
reluctance might be explained by the language of the constitutional texts,
as well as by each Court's history. Before a breach of constitutional rights
can be found under either document, the courts must conclude that the
punishment imposed is cruel. Though some might argue that punishment
is inherently cruel, sanctions are necessary. It is therefore difficult to specify
with any degree of objectivitywhen a sentence should be designated as cruel
and unusual. In any case, there may be an unspoken sense in this
jurisprudence that the days of state-imposed cruelty are over. Absent the
8 9 Ibid. at 1008. The amount of pure cocaine in the defendant's possession would yield between
32,500 and 65,000 doses. Ibid. at 1002. In the circumstances, Mr. Justice Kennedy agreed that the state
could with reason conclude that the threats posed by his possession of this large amount of cocaine
were "momentous enough towarrant the deterrence and retribution of a life sentence without parole."
Ibid. at 1003.
90 Ibid.
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infliction of extreme physical pain, understandable disagreement exists as
to what might or might not be considered cruel as a form of punishment.
It is not apparent, in such circumstances, why the courts, rather than the
legislatures, should decide that question. At least in Canada, the courts
prefer to debate such concerns under section Ts concepts of fairness and
fundamental justice.91
The jurisprudence in both countries employs a concept of
proportionality and in each, the disproportionality between the crime and
its punishment must cross a high threshold to violate the Constitution. A
sentence that is harsh, severe, or merely disproportionate does not invite
review: the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is not
engaged until gross disproportionality is shown. The standard is high
because the Supreme Court of Canada and the United States Supreme
Court appear to agree that sentencing policy is a prerogative of legislative
decision-maling. The assumption is questionable, especially considering
how willing the courts have been to second-guess democratic choices in so
many other areas. In Canada, for example, the Supreme Court of Canada
showed little hesitation in constitutionalizing the concept of mens rea, and
extended its interference with the substantive criminal law into the field of
defences.92
That the Supreme Court of Canada and United States Supreme
Court share an institutional reluctance to declare that the state has been
cruel should not be taken as a signal that American experience is relevant
or should be regarded as a model for emulation. To the contrary,
distinctions on key points of constitutionalism suggest that the United
States jurisprudence is of little value in Charter interpretation. As the
discussion has shown, the United States Supreme Court's response to
mandatory prison sentences is entangled in the messy jurisprudence
surrounding the death penalty. As a result, the existence of capital
punishment has motivated some members of the United States Supreme
Court to reject the Eighth Amendment's application to mandatory prison
sentences. However, that consideration is entirely irrelevant in Canada,
where the death penalty was abolished some years ago. In addition, the
91 Kindlerv. Canada (MAin. of Justice), [199112 S.C.R. 779;Reference re g E,-,radfton, [199112
S.C.R. S58; and Bums, supra note 34 (concluding that the constitutionahty of extraditing indmduals
to face the death penalty should be addressed under s. 7 and not under s. 12).
92 See . v. Vaillancourt, [19S7] 2 S.C.R. 636 and R. v. Martmcau, [19901 2 S-CR, 633 (both
addressing the issue ofmens rea under s. 7 of the Chancr). see alsoR. % Dat tdari, [199413 S CR 63
and R v. Ruzic, [2001) 1 S.CR. 6S7 (both addressing the oanstitutt onahty of defences to criminal
offences).
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states' jurisdiction over criminal justice led the United States Supreme
Court to conclude that constitutional oversight of sentencing policies is
inappropriate on federalism grounds. Once again, given section 91(27) of
the ConstitutionAct, 1867, that is an irrelevant consideration under section
12 of the Charter.
In policy terms, American constraints on the review of mandatory
sentences have produced tragic results. United States prisons are horribly
overcrowded. An accretion to the power of prosecutors has supplanted the
discretion of judges. Most important, mandatory minima impose non-
individuated sentences that are disproportionately harsh. The rationale for
this response is to deter crime. Thus far, there is little evidence to support
any effective connection between mandatory minima and a reduction in
crime.
As this article went to press, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
rendered its decision in Andrade v. California.93 Without invalidating
California's three-strikes law, the panel held that Leandro Andrade's life
sentence in prison with no possibility of parole for fifty years grossly
violated the Eighth Amendment.94 The significance of this decision will
unquestionably be debated. On one hand, Mr. Justice Paez's majority
opinion carefully analyzed United States Supreme Court authority and
found the facts of the defendant's case compelling under the Eighth
Amendment. From that perspective, Andrade may only encourage claims
under the Constitution in the most egregious circumstances of three strikes
legislation. On the otherAndrade represents the first lower court challenge
to the United States Supreme Court's apparent determination to restrict
the Eighth Amendment to capital cases. On that view, the reigning
interpretation of Harmelin may be vulnerable after all.
Time can only tell; meanwhile, Canadians should challenge the
Supreme Court of Canada's reluctance to invalidate mandatory minima
under the Charter. In addition, Canadians should discourage any initiatives
at the legislative level to introduce new forms of mandatory sentence. If
ever a reason is needed to explain why these sentences are bad public
93 [2001]CA9-QL 670 (Cir. Ct. App.), online: QL (CA9C) (Mr. Justice Sneed concurring in part
and dissenting in part) [hereinafter Andrade].
9 4 See alsosupra note 93 at 2 (Andrade was convicted of two counts of petty theft for shoplifting
nine videotapes from two Kmart stores. Offences which would ordinarily be treated as misdemeanours,
each punishable by up to six months in jail and a fine up to one thousand dollars, fell under the state's
three-strikes regime because of the accused's prior offences, which were non-violent and included
shoplifting merchandise twice worth a total of $153.54).
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policy, it is the United States, which stands as a compelling example of the
failure of mandatory minima as a solution to crime control.

